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The IATRC is a group of more than 80 economists interested  in agricultural
trade, drawn from the academic community, government, and private institutions
in North America and seven other countries.  Founded in 1980, the Consortium has
the following objectives:
(1)  to facilitate and stimulate improvement  in  the quality  and relevance  of
international agricultural  trade research and policy analysis;
(2)  to facilitate collaborative  research among its  members;
(3)  to  facilitate  interaction  among  researchers  and analysts  in  different
countries, universities, and governments engaged in and/or interested in
trade research; and
(4)  to improve the general  understanding of international  trade and  trade
policy issues among the public at large.
In order to further these objectives, the Consortium  established  three  task
force  groups  early  in  1988  to  examine  the  issues  involved  in  dealing  with
agricultural trade problems through the current roundof international negotiations
under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GAIT). Funding for the three
groups was provided by the U.S. and Canadian governments.  Summaries of the
work and conclusions of the three task forces were presented at the Symposium
in Annapolis, Maryland  on August  19-20,  1988.  The  summaries  are  titled  as
follows:
(1)  Assessing the Benefits of Trade Liberalization
(2)  Designing Acceptable  Agricultural Policies
(3)  Negotiating  a Framework  for Action.
The more detailed set of papers, upon which these summaries are based, will
be published in book form during 1989.
For further  copies  of these  reports  or information  on  the  IATRC  and  its
activities, contact:
Professor David Blandford,  Chairman
International  Agricultural Trade Research Consortium
455 Warren Hall
Cornell University
Ithaca, NY  14853
United States of America
Telephone:  607-255-8187DESIGNING  ACCEPTABLE  AGRICULTURAL
POLICIES
This  report  analyzes  the  types of agricultural  policies  that  can  achieve
domestic objectives and be consistent with liberal and nondiscriminatory  trade.
Several  objectives  underlie  the  agricultural  policies  of  countries  which  are
signatories  to the General  Agreement  on  Tariffs  and  Trade (GATT).  Farm
income support is provided by industrial countries to ensure the viability of their
agricultural  and rural economies.  Economic  stability  is  a  major  objective,
particularly in developing countries  which  seek  to promote 'food  security'  by
ensuring  an  adequate  domestic  supply  of  food  at  'reasonable'  prices.
Environmental  objectives  are  also  important,  as  reflected  in  agricultural
programs  for  conserving land and  water resources,  wildlife  habitats,  and  the
scenic  beauty of rural  areas.  Finally,  the provision of public goods,  such  as
research and development (R&D), information,  food inspection,  and extension
services is a feature of agricultural policy in many countries.
The legitimacy  of domestic policy  objectives  is  not debated  as  they  are
deemed to beoutside the realm of the GATT negotiations. However, the measures
used  to achieve  objectives  must be  brought  under  the  GATI  if they  create
international market distortions.  In order to contribute to this process, this report
assesses  the types of policy  measures  that can  be  used  to achieve  domestic
objectives and yet promote liberal and nondiscriminatory  trade in agricultural
products.
Farm Income Support
A key policy objective  in industrial countries  is to support farm incomes.
Many income support measures also distort international trade.  The challenge is
to devise measures which both provide support and are minimally trade distorting.
Current  Income Support Policies and  Trade  Distortions
A listing of the major types of income support measures is given in the table
on page 2.  The categories identified are based on the relative impact of policies
on world markets. Emphasis is placed on traditional agricultural programs which
are commodity specific, and support producer incomes through explicit taxes or
higher consumer prices.Ranking Agricultural Support Policies By Trade Distortions
1.  Production Subsidies  (incl.  price  supports  with  deficiency  payments,
'stabilization'  payments  and government procurement)  and Taxes (incl.
co-responsibility levies, super-levies, etc.).
2.  Input Subsidies (for credit, fertilizer, irrigation,  crop insurance,  interest
rates, etc.) and Taxes (e.g., land).
3.  Production/Marketing  Quotas  (incl.  two-price  schemes,  'maximum
guaranteed quantities,'  etc.) and Input Controls (e.g., acreage set-asides,
etc.).
4.  Consumption  Taxes,  Quotas (rationing)  or Subsidies  (incl.  domestic
price ceilings with consumer deficiency payments and domestic food aid).
5.  Marketing  Taxes  (e.g.,  value-added  tax)  and  Subsidies  (e.g.,  trans.
subsidies).
6.  Imperfect Market Structure (producer/consumer monopolies, parastatal
marketing boards,  etc.).
7.  Import/Export Taxes and Subsidies (ad valorem and specific) and under/
over valued exchange rates.
8.  Import/Export Quotas (incl. 'voluntary'  export restraints, state  trading
and orderly marketing arrangements).
9.  Contingent  Export/Import  Subsidies  and  Taxes  (incl.  export
enhancement  programs,  domestic  price  supports  with  variable  import
levies/export restitutions,  and countervailing and anti-dumping duties).
International  trade  is  affected  by  changes  in  domestic  production  and
consumption.  The degree to  which  income  support  measures  distort trade  is
determined by how much the policies affect production or consumption.  For a
given  level of income support, border measures are more trade distorting than
most  domestic  policy  measures  because  they  affect  both  production  and
consumption directly. Domestic measures, such as production or input subsidies,
are less trade distorting.  They affect production, but do not have a major impact
on consumption.  Such subsidies can be targeted directly to farmers, rather than
indirectly,  as with policies  which  change output prices  or with other types  of
subsidies.  They are therefore  both a more efficient means of supporting  farm
incomes, and less trade distorting.
Among  border  measures,  tariffs  and  subsidies  are  less  trade  distorting
because they allow changes in international prices to be reflected domestically.
Production  and consumption  will vary  in response to changes in world market
conditions. Quantitative restrictions, variable levies, and price fixing schemes do
not allow such response and are likely to be more trade distorting.  Other types ofquantitative  restrictions,  such  as output  or marketing  quotas,  are  inferior  to
production subsidies because they affect domestic prices and consumption.  They
can be less trade distorting than border measures, but this depends on the relative
size  of their  effects  on  prices  and  trade.  The  difficulty  of monitoring  the
international effects of domestic quantitative restrictions makes them aproblematic
method of income support in the context of the GATT.
A combination  of support measures  is typically  found  in most countries.
Often it is difficult to determine the amount of trade distortion due  to a single
instrument.  The  level of distortion  can change  as the combination  of policy
measures  or their settings are altered.  There exists a continuum  of distortions
under each  'package'  of policy  measures employed by governments.  Current
programs,  such as those involving acreage controls and deficiency payments  in
the United States and price supports with co-responsibility levies and 'maximum
guarantee  quantities'  in the  European  Community,  are  examples  of complex
combinations  of policy  measures  which  can  create  different  levels  of  trade
distortion depending on the particular combination of measures in place and their
settings.
Reforming Income Support Policies
The least distorting  way to support farm incomes  is to make payments  to
farmers independent of the level of production.  Such payments would not affect
production or consumption and would therefore not affect international trade.  In
practice,  a  distortion-free  method  for  making  direct  payments  is  extremely
difficult to design since most transfers have some effect on output.  These effects
result from the impact of payments on the decisions of individuals whether to enter
or leave an industry, their work or leisure choices, and their saving, investment and
consumption decisions.  Hence, the challenge becomes one of finding an income
transfer mechanism which is less distorting than those currently used.
Less-distorting  transfer mechanisms could include  negative income  taxes,
adjustment assistance payments, and welfare payments.  These options would be
compatible with the GATT because they are minimally trade distorting, if they are
implemented correctly.  Adjustment assistance, for example, has a role to play in
this regard and is discussed later in this report.  However, for the most part direct
payments  unrelated  to  production  represent  a  radical  change  from  current
commodity-based  support  policies  in  agriculture  and  are  unlikely  to  be  an
attractive option to policymakers and farmers.  Hence,  the problem becomes one
of finding  a traditional  commodity-based  approach  that both provides income
support and minimizes  trade distortions.
Four criteria are used  in designing  an  alternative  policy  that meets  these
requirements:(1)  minimize trade distortions, i.e., generate production and consumption as
close to free trade levels as possible;
(2)  achieve national objectives, particularly  in maintaining farm incomes;
(3)  be politically acceptable to national governments;
(4)  be administratively feasible.
Many current policies  do not meet the first criterion and are very inefficient  in
meeting  the second.  They depress  world prices,  rather  than leading  to a real
increase in farm incomes, they  create substantial  'leakages'  to input-supplying
and output-using industries and to foreign consumers, and they generate inefficiency
in the allocation of resources due to overproduction  and underconsumption.  The
alternative approach  proposed does not suffer from these deficiencies.
Income  Support - the PEG  Alternative
To overcome the shortcomings  of current support policies, we propose that
national governments adopt a device called Production Entitlement Guarantees
(PEGs). A PEG is a pre-specified limit on the quantity of production eligible to
receive support payments.  The actual production of each farmer is unconstrained
and is ideally based on world market prices.  Consumer prices under the PEG
scheme are equal to world market prices,  requiring the elimination of all other
border and internal support measures except for payments on the specified PEG
quantity.  This is equivalent to setting all 'consumer subsidy equivalents'  (CSEs)
and 'producer subsidy equivalents'  (PSEs) to zero except for payments to farmers
on the PEG quantity.
The  diagram  on page  5 depicts  the outcome  under  a PEG  scheme  for  a
commodity  in a single country.  World prices before and after multilateral trade
liberalization are given by WPo and WP1, respectively.  Output at the free trade
price WP1 is at A, as determined by the supply curve S.  The domestic support price
SP exceeds the world price WP1 but payments to farmers are limited by the level
of the PEG.  The PEG can be issued to each farmer on the basis of some fraction
of historical level of production.  Support payments with no restrictions would
result in an output level of B.  However, the PEG  places a fixed  limit on the
quantity of production  on which  support payments  are  made such that output
occurs  at  the market  price.  The  support  price  has  no  impact on  production
decisions provided the PEG is to the left of A in the diagram.  The following
steps are  required for each country  to achieve  the desired results under a PEG
scheme:
*  eliminate all border and domestic support measures such that consumer prices
equal world market prices;
*  determine  the  level  of income  transfers  to  farmers by  specifying  a  fixed
domestic support price (or level of PEG payments);
4* establish a PEG quantity that is less than the output that would be produced
under multilateral free trade prices.
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Setting the PEG
The most difficult aspect in implementing PEG is to determine whether or not
the production quantity eligible for support in each country is such that the world
price determines production decisions by farmers.  If the PEG quantity is set too
high it can distort trade.  In the diagram, output would be at B if a commodity's
historical production  were  supported  at SP (assuming there are  no production
quotas). Fixing the PEG quantity at this production level would distort production
and trade, since world prices would not rise above SP.  If prices rise above SP, a
PEG based on historical production will not be trade distorting.
5The quantity of  production eligible for support under a PEG scheme must be
determined  in the GATT  negotiations.  As  an illustration,  however,  the table
below  gives the percent adjustment in world prices towards free trade levels for
selected  commodities  with  PEGs  established  at  either  100  percent  of  1986
production (PEG10o) or at 80 percent (PEG8 ) of production.  In both  cases, the
actual level of support per unit is kept at that actually estimated for 1986 through
the PSE.  The results show that all sectors would have had at least 80 percent of
the desired change in world prices under PEG10 o. On average, 90 percent of the
desired world price change would have occurred.  In the case of a PEGso scheme,
over 90 percent of the desired world price adjustment would have taken place in
all cases, with an overall average of 98 percent.  Hence, a PEG of 80 percent of
1986 production levels provides a rough indication  of the appropriate goal for a
negotiated PEG quantity if historical levels of support are maintained.
Percent  Adjustment  of World  Prices  Towards  Free  Trade  Levels  With
PEGS
PEGI0o   PEGso
Beef  92.6  99.6
Pork  93.0  99.1
Poultry meat  93.0  99.5
Butter  93.5  99.5
Wheat  83.1  97.3
Corn  82.4  98.2
Rice  84.5  90.0
Soybeans  94.4  99.1
Cotton  92.0  99.0
Sugar  87.4  94.5
Average  89.6  97.6
Note: estimated using 1986 data.
The accompanying diagram on page 7 shows the percentage of the free trade
value of world trade in 1986 for selected commodities under the status quo (actual
policies), PEG100 o o and PEGso.  For example, the value of trade in sugar under actual
policies  was only 50 percent of the free  trade level in  1986, while a PEG10 o  and
PEG80 so scheme would have increased trade values to 75 and 88 percent of the free
trade level, respectively.  The results show that a PEGo 80 or PEG0o scheme would
have increased the value of trade substantially (with the exception of rice).  For
the most part, the value of trade under PEG would have been within 90 percent of
free trade levels.Impact of  PEG on  the  Value  of  World  Trade  (1986)













10  20  30  40
Percent of
PEG 80 ,/
50  70  BO  90  100
trade  level
Issuing and Transferring PEGs
Full discretion  would be given  to national  governments  over how and to
whom the initial PEGs are issued.  However, PEG quantities and the maximum
payment associated with them would be bound within the GATT.  An argument
can  be  made  that PEGs  should  be  transferable  among  farmers  or  farms  on
efficiency grounds. This may unduly limit domestic flexibility in meeting support
objectives. Topreventan increase in enterprises (farms or farmers and commodity
sectors) receiving support payments, countries would agree to bind the maximum
level of support in each sector (using, for example, historical PSEs) and bind the
number of commodity sectors receiving support.  This would limit potential trade
distortions  due to  the  effects of PEG payments  on farmers'  entry/exit,  work/
leisure, and consumption/investment  decisions.  Individual PEGs could be issued
to existing farmers on the basis of  production quotas currently held in Canada and
the European Community or land 'base' and 'program' yields in the United States.
New entrants  to farming would have to either purchase (lease) PEGs from other
farmers  or obtain  them  directly  from  the  government,  otherwise  they would
produce at world  market prices and receive no PEG payments.  PEGs could be
I  j  I  I  I
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wissued by the government on the basis of  the farm (in which case the value of  PEGs
will be reflected in the value of land) or for an individual farmer (in which case
the value of PEGs will be reflected in the value of a certificate of eligibility).  If
governments wish to have a pool of PEGs available for new entrants, then a fixed
percentage  of all private PEG  transactions  (farm-to-farm  sales, parents  to son/
daughter, etc.) would be automatically reclaimed by the government to pass on to
these entrants. Indeed, such reclaimed PEGs couldbe used to reduce the aggregate
level of PEGs to the left of A in the diagram on page 5.  Government purchases
of PEGs  could also  be used  to transfer PEGs  to  new entrants,  to reduce  the
aggregate PEG level to ensure it is to the left of A, or to eliminate ('buy out') high
costproduction which causes trade distortions.  PEG buy-outsprovideamechanism
to  facilitate  the  exit of uncompetitive  farmers  and  the  rationalization  of the
farming sector in the face of competitive pressures.
A rental market would be an ideal method of transfer  from an international
perspective since this would permit the monitoring of whether a particular PEG
results in a trade distortion. If the annual rental value of the PEG per unit is greater
than the government's PEG payment, then production will be to the left of point
A in the diagram  on page 5 and no trade distortion will exist.  If PEGS are  not
transferable,  over-production  can  still occur  even if the  aggregate PEG  is  set
below A. High-cost producers will remain in production if more efficient farmers
are  not allowed  to  bid  for  PEGs.  Trade  distortions  will  occur.  However,
governments need not require  that producers must supply the PEG  quantity  in
order to receive PEG payments.  In this case, the PEG scheme will not be trade
distorting regardless of whether PEGs are transferable.
Consumer and Taxpayer Implications of PEG
The implementation  of a PEG involves the elimination  of all other policy
interventions identified in the table on page 2. It is critical that the only potential
source  of distortion  be on  the supply  side because  the world price is the only
available  indicator for monitoring  the degree of supply  distortion  due to PEG
payments. However, a major political disadvantage is that all transfers under PEG
are paid by taxpayers and hence are more visible.  Maintaining a desired level of
producer  income  by  switching  the  entire  cost  of  support  to  taxpayers  could
increase government expenditures substantially for somecommodities, especially
in Japan and the European Community.  However, there are several features of a
PEG scheme that reduce the potential political problems:
* world  prices  rise:  with  multilateral  free  trade  and  decreased  domestic
consumer prices, world prices rise. The resulting taxpayer savings can be used
to replace traditional transfers from consumers  in order to maintain producer
income (indeed, total taxpayer costs could decline).*  efficiency  of transfers improves:  much of the current transfers, especially
underE.C. and U.S.programs are wasted (given to importers orare 'deadweight
losses')  and never  reach  domestic  farmers.  With  a PEG  scheme,  all  the
taxpayer support is transferred directly to farmers as income with little loss due
to 'overproduction'  and transfers to the rest of the world  (see  Box on next
page).  Furthermore,  a PEG scheme will benefit livestock,  poultry and dairy
farmers  in many countries by reducing cereal prices.
*  taxpayers are consumers:  for the most part, taxpayers are consumers.  All
that a PEG scheme does  is  alter the method by which  income transfers  to
farmers are made. Using high consumer prices to support agricultural incomes
is also generally more regressive than using tax revenues, since it tends to place
the burden of paying for support on the poor rather than the rich.
*  target all farmers and limit per farm  payments:  if traditional  levels of
producer  income  cannot  be  maintained  without unacceptable  increases  in
taxpayer costs, then governments can limit the per farm transfer to keep within
budget  constraints.  Such targeting  could be used to assist  small or family
farms, and disadvantaged  areas, rather than providing  support  for larger or
richer farmers.
PEGs and the United  States
For grains, rice and cotton, U.S. target price/deficiency payment programs
have evolved substantially in recent years towards aPEG model.  Under the 1985
Farm Bill, each  farm has an established base acreage and program yield  upon
which a farmer's payments are based. To  make currentprogramsPEG-compatible,
all acreage reduction provisions and CCC loans would be eliminated.  Farm-level
base acreage and program yields would be reduced and unconditionally  frozen.
Related  policies  such  as export subsidies  and CCC  surplus-disposal  activities
would be eliminated.  For other commodities, notably sugar, dairy, tobacco and
peanuts,  a scheme similar to the one described above for the target-price crops
would  be implemented.  Existing measures,  such  as import quotas  that distort
consumer prices, would be phased out.
One proposal currently under consideration for program crops is conceptually
consistent with the PEG.  The Boschwitz/Boren bill is a close approximation to
a PEG scheme.  It freezes payment bases at or near current program levels  and
makes  future  payments  at  a  declining  rate,  independent  of output  or  input
decisions. The Boschwitz approach has so far failed tobe enacted,butits time may
come as part of multilateral agricultural policy reform.  Although a PEG scheme
does not necessarily require a phase-down of the level of support, it does require
the extension of the Boschwitz approach to other commodities currently receiving
support in the United States.THE ADVANTAGES  OF PEGs TO FARMERS
PEG  provides  a  means  for  governments  to  continue  to  protect  the
incomes of domestic  farmers.  World market prices of major agricultural
commodities are expected to rise by an average of 25 percent with the reform
of agricultural policies worldwide.  This means that one-quarter of current
farm income 'subsidies'  are needed just to offset the price-depressing effect
of existing farm programs.  Of the remaining 'subsidy', farmers only receive
a fraction.  On average,  35  percent  of the  total  transfer  from  domestic
consumers and taxpayers is lost because of inefficiencies created by distorted
production  and  consumption,  and  through  transfer  'leakages'  to  input-
supplying and output-using industries and to foreign consumers.  When all
the  inefficiencies  of  current  programs  are  taken  into  account,  farmers
probably receive on average 40 percent of the total subsidy paid by taxpayers
and consumers.  PEG eliminates  virtually all the  inefficiencies  of current
transfer policies.  Farmers receive 100 percent of the PEG payment.  Farmers
should support PEG because it is more effective in protecting farm incomes
than  existing programs.  Consumers  and  taxpayers  should  support  PEG
because it is a less expensive way to support farm  incomes.
Farmers'  Share  of  Agricultural  Income  Support
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GPEGs and the European  Community
PEGs provide a flexible and straightforward method for providing income
support for Community farmers under the now accepted principle of limiting the
quantity eligible for support through 'maximum guarantee quantities'. Production
quotas already exist for sugar and milk, and have been discussed for cereals.  The
transition  to  a  PEG program  in the European  Community  would  require the
replacement  of production  quotas by limitations on the quantity of production
eligible for support payments.
In the case of milk, the existing quota mechanism would be changed to a right
to support rather than a right to produce.  This right would be tradeable between
farmers  within countries.  Reductions in the amount of milk production eligible
for support could be achieved  by the intervention  authorities buying  in quota
rights,  rather than  surplus  milk products.  Limits  on  the quantity  eligible  for
support could be used to target aid to smaller milk producers  without seriously
distorting the pattern  of production.  Achieving  the necessary changes  on the
demand side is straightforward  in principle, but presents more problems for the
political acceptability of the policy.  In order to ensure that the incentive price for
E.C.  consumers  is  the  world price,  intervention  purchases  of dairy  products,
export subsidies, and import levies would need to be eliminated gradually.  This
would shift the  burden of the support from the consumer to the taxpayer and would
increase the budgetary cost of the program.  However, the change could be phased
in  as  the  production  quotas  were  phased  out.  Budgetary  savings  from  the
reduction in surplus disposal costs would be used to pay producer subsidies (on
the PEG quantity).
PEG also provides a realistic and practical policy alternative for the cereals
sector.  Intervention and market prices of cereals would be allowed to fall towards
competitive world levels, with the resulting budget savings being used to provide
support payments.  These would be limited per farm, enabling the benefits of the
policy to be targeted rather than determined by level of production, as at present.
SincePEG allows for adegree of national flexibility, itoffers the negotiatingroom
necessary for the scheme to be politically acceptable  within the Community.
The E.C. sugar regime  already  involves the  concept of limitations on the
volume of production eligible for support.  'A' quota receives the full Community
support price, 'B'  quota is taxed with a co-responsibility  levy, while  'C' quota
sugar receives the world sugar price.  Converting this system to the PEG involves
elimination of border protection measures and the payment of a limited subsidy
for 'A' quota to make up the difference between the domestic support price and
the  world  price.  Again,  this shift  would involve  some  increase  in  budgetary
expenditure, but the increase would be reduced by the rise in world sugar prices
following multilateral deregulation of the sugar market. Current proposals for the
reform of the beef market within  the Community  envisage replacement of the
11intervention mechanisms by a payment per head for breeding cows, on a limited
basis per farm.  Providing border protection is also eliminated and the production
levels eligible for support are kept within nondistorting bounds, this proposal  is
also consistent with  PEG.  Similar arrangements  are  possible  for other  E.C.
products.
Adjustment Assistance and  Compensation
The PEG is a type of scheme which can be used to provide income support
to farmers over the long term.  It can also be used to provide  compensation  or
adjustment assistance to farmers with a change in trade policies. For example, the
government could 'buy in' PEGs from farmers through a bid system like that used
recently  in the U.S.  dairy herd buy-out scheme.  A one-time  cash payment to
farmers could be used to compensate farmers for the change in trade policies and
to promote adjustment to freer trade.  However, governments may wish to use
additional transitory measures to compensate those  affected by trade liberalization,
and to promote adjustment in industries affected by liberalization.  Such measures
may be important for firms and labor in upstream (output using) and downstream
(input supplying)  industries affected  by agricultural  trade liberalization.  The
problem is one of  determining adjustment assistance measures which are minimally
trade distorting.
Trade adjustment  assistance  (TAA)  programs  have existed  in the  United
States since the early 1960s. U.S. programs have generally had both a compensation
component  and  an adjustment  component.  Compensation  is  typically  made
through a one-time payment (or flow of  payments) to workers or firms who suffer
a loss of income as aresult of a change in trade policy. The adjustment component
of TAA programs has included payments to facilitate job search, relocation and
retraining.  These measures are designed to aid the movement of labor resources
out of an industry suffering dislocation as the result of international competition.
The  current  U.S.  trade  adjustment  program,  which  applies  to  only  the
industrial and services sectors of the economy, has been heavily weighted towards
compensation.  More than 97 percent of the $4.5 billion which has been paid out
in worker benefits has been used for income maintenance.  Only in the last five
years  has  more  emphasis  been  given  to  training  and  relocation  assistance.
Adjustment assistance to firms has primarily been in the form of loans and loan
guarantees, with some technical assistance.  Instead of facilitating the movement
of resources out of declining industries, these measures have largely attempted to
enable firms to remain viable by making them more competitive internationally.
Many such firms have defaulted on their loans.
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existing U.S. trade adjustment assistance program for two reasons.  First, current
legislation only recognizes injury from the removal of import barriers.  All of the
major U.S. agricultural crops are exported.  Trade liberalization implies a change
in  government  programs  which  have  permitted  the  current  level  of exports.
Second, most of the family farm owner-operators  who, with their families,
contribute  more than 75 percent of the labor hours  in the sector  would not
qualify for the worker portion of the program since they are self-employed and do
not have enough hired labor to qualify for the firm assistance provisions.
An agricultural  trade adjustment assistance  program, which is compatible
with the goals of trade liberalization, would have to be structured much differently
from the current program. It would contain an adjustment component for farmers
and a compensation  component for the owners of land and capital.  Benefits to
farmers would be triggered by a change in U.S. policy which causes agricultural
exports  to decline or imports to  increase.  Once triggered,  the benefits  would
become available to all producers with a specified minimum base acreage  in the
affected commodity.  Producers would then have alimited time period-say, one
year - to decide whether to participate in one of two benefit options.  The first
option would be to accept one year of temporary income payments, training and
relocation assistance in return for finding employment outside ofagriculture. The
second option would provide  additional social  security  benefits to farmers 55
years or older who are willing to accept early retirement.
The cost of this program would not be large in comparison  to current farm
programs.  Of the estimated million worker-years of labor in the agricultural labor
force,  a  maximum  of 60  thousand  would  leave  agriculture  under  the  most
pessimistic assumptions about the effects of trade liberalization.  Even if benefits
are five times the $5,000  per worker paid out at the peak of the present TAA
program, the cost of relocating these farmers would be a one-time paymentof only
$1.5  billion - far less than the annual cost of $20 to $30 billion of current farm
programs.
The compensation component would be triggered by the same mechanism as
the adjustment component and could apply to the agricultural production sector
as well as to input suppliers and processors.  Compensation could be in the form
of a one-time discounted payment for the estimated income that would have been
realized  from  the affected  assets over time  if these had continued  to be fully
employed.  The  estimated  present  value  of adjustment  costs  for  11  major
agricultural commodities is $284 million under the most pessimistic assumptions
about the effect of trade liberalization (assuming an interest rate of 6 percent and
a useful life of farm capital of 10 years).  Compensation costs would be greater if
input and processing industries were included but, in comparison to current farm
programs, they are small.
13Stability and Food Security
Current farm support policies have important implications for the stability of
both domestic and international markets. Some policies are justified primarily on
the  grounds  that they  ensure  domestic  stability.  There  are  several  types  of
variability  in agricultural  markets,  but the instability  created  by  random  and
largely unpredictable  factors such as weather and disease produce  the greatest
problems.  Agricultural  stabilization policies try to  control the effects of these
factors.  Unfortunately, many policies which reduce domestic instability increase
international  instability.  There are two ways in which  this occurs.  First, some
policies alter the extent to which fluctuations in domestic supply and demand are
passed onto world markets through variations  in the volume of trade.  Second,
sorhe policies affect national absorption of international variability by modifying
the responsiveness of trade to fluctuations in international prices.
The  scope  for  short-run  adjustments  in production  to  offset  domestic  or
international  variability is limited for most agricultural commodities because of
biological rigidities.  Adjustments must be made in consumption,  stocks, or trade.
Many domestic agricultural policies affect the extent to which these adjustments
take  place.  Some  policies  discourage  private  stockholding.  Some  policies
prevent  stocks  and  consumption  from responding  to  changes  in international
prices, while others cause a country to 'export'  domestic instability through trade.
A country  which maintains  domestic  stability  by  exporting  its own  domestic
instability and insulating itself from international  markets  will create domestic
stability at the expense of greater instability in other countries.  The problem is to
design policies that meet domestic stability objectives without introducing such
international  distortions.
The  Reform of Domestic Agricultural Policies
Many domestic agricultural policies are internationally destabilizing.  Import
quotas and variable levies prevent domestic adjustments in response to changes
in international prices.  Tariffs are a less-distorting  form  of protection from the
point of view of stability.  Government management of domestic stocks or trade
which allows response  to fluctuations in domestic production and international
prices are preferable to stable stocks or trade.
Only a few countries absorb domestic  market fluctuations by using public
stocks.  Many countries keep domestic prices stable by changing the volume of
trade  to  offset  domestic  fluctuations  in  supply  or demand.  These  measures
destabilize  world  markets.  Few  countries  allow  public  stocks  to  respond  to
changes in world prices.  U.S. public grain stocks are a rare example.
If countries were to allow stocks or trade to vary inversely  with changes in
international prices, this would help to offset the effects of domestic agricultural
14policies on world market stability. Domestic stabilization policies are not always
internationally  destabilizing,  particularly  if  a  country  has  highly  unstable
production.  Changes in the rules for managing public stocks, pricing policies, or
trade controls can help to promote stability at the same time as promoting freer
trade.  The destabilizing effects of existing forms of agricultural support could be
reduced either by changing the form of support (for example, to the PEG scheme
discussed  above),  or by  using additional  measures  to  offset  the  destabilizing
effects of existing policies.  Both of these should be considered as options in the
GATT negotiations.
Policies for Producer Income Stability
The reform of agricultural  support policies  and the  introduction  of direct
income  support  measures  such  as  the PEG  described  above  breaks  the  link
between income transfers and production decisions.  However, a direct income
support scheme  may not necessarily  stabilize net farm income  because  world
prices and input costs will still be variable.  The challenge is to design a program
that stabilizes net income without raising it.  A number of alternatives can be
considered, depending on the degree of stability to be provided to an individual
producer.  At one end of the continuum would be income insurance, which could
be designed to assure a producer up to 100 percent of average, market-determined
income.  At the other end of the continuum would be a scheme which is based on
stabilization of sectoral price or income (see Box on following page).  Inthese
schemes, an individual producer's income is stabilized only to the extent that it is
correlated with sectoral performance, and to the extent that an individual's share
of the sectoral stabilization pool is adequate to cover a loss when one occurs. The
level  of government participation  also could vary  along  the  continuum,  from
extensive  contribution  to income insurance,  to no contribution  to a producer-
financed partial stabilization  scheme.
Somelevelofgovernmentparticipation  in farm incomestabilizationprograms
must be accepted within the GATT because income loss in agriculture does not
have the characteristics of a privately  insurable risk.  Agricultural income risks
arise from variability in prices and yields.  A barrier to private insurance is the lack
of independence  among prices received  by commodity producers.  Moreover,
prices are related from one year to the next by carryover from previous harvests.
Some yield risks, such as drought, may  also affect large numbers of producers.
Because of these factors, 'actuarially fair' insurance would either be prohibitively
expensive or its coverage too limited.
To be compatible with GATT, a stabilization program could not involvean
open-ended commitment to transfer income to producers.  In other words it would
have  to be  'PEG  compatible'.  An  open-ended  funding  commitment  would
increase  output above  market-determined  levels, and distort trade.  Maximum
government  contributions  to  producer  income  stabilization  schemes  would
15therefore have to be bound under GATT,  and the rules for payouts agreed.  A
similar requirement would  apply to schemes for 'disaster'  payments  and crop
insurance.  Stabilization payment rules could include the targeting of payouts to
each producer rather than on the basis of sector returns.  They could be based on
a means test for eligibility. It would also be possible to institute a requirement that
a premium be paid by the producer for the benefit of stabilization (essentially the
provision of insurance).  This premium could then be subsidized if lower-income
producers were  to be singled out for special  assistance.
Policies for Consumer Price Stability and  Food Security
The removal of existing protective policies for national markets is likely to
lead to greater stability in international agricultural markets.  Trade liberalization
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THE WESTERN  GRAIN STABILIZATION PROGRAM  (WGSA)
The Canadian Western Grain  Stabilization Act (WGSA) is one of the
most  sophisticated  farm income stabilization  schemes  in the world.  It is
jointly funded by producers and the government.  Producers normally pay 2
percent of their gross receipts per  year into the fund; the Canadian government
pays an amount  equal to 4 percent of gross receipts.  Income stabilization
payments are made to participating farmers when net  receipts fall belowa pre-
specified level, based  on the industry average for the previous  five years.
Because  of the government's  contribution,  there is an element  of income
support in the WGSA.  Such  support is likely to increase grain production
above free trade levels and create a trade distortion.  There is an upper limit
on payments in any given  year, but there is an incentive  for producers  to
expand production in order to increase their entitlement to payments.  In order
to reduce the possible trade-distorting  effect of the WGSA, the element of
government support must be capped.  One way to do this would be to place
a  maximum  limit  on  the  quantity  of production  on  which  stabilization
payments can be made.  This would remove the incentive to expand output in
order to capture government payments.  The limit on the public contribution
tothe scheme could be offsetby allowing farmers to buy additional stabilization
protection through increased personal contributions.  Additional  protection
would be priced at  the full rate, and would not be subsidized at the 4/2 formula
of  the current scheme. With these modifications, the possible trade-distorting
effect of the WGSA would be reduced and the scheme would still provide
publicly-supported income stabilization to farmers.would improve the functioning of international markets substantially and make
them  less sensitive to the effects of external  shocks.  The incentive  for private
individuals to hold stocks would increase if  many of the existing domestic support
policies  were removed.  Mechanisms  for  spreading  risk  and reducing  price
variability  such  as  futures  markets  could operate  more  efficiently  within  an
expanded market. Nevertheless, some governments may consider that liberalization
alone is not sufficient to produce an acceptable level of price stability or security
of supply.
One necessary step to meet these concerns is to ensure that internationally
agreed rules through GATT prevent countries from unilaterally imposing trade
restrictions to stabilize domestic markets during periods of  pronounced uncertainty
or variability.  Thus, the arbitrary  imposition of export embargoes  to stabilize
domestic markets would be prohibited within GATT.  Mechanisms to exchange
information on the supply, demand and stocks situation in trading countries would
be improved. Governments would be permitted to purchase commodities in order
to maintain a stabilization reserve either for their own use or to meet the needs of
poorer countries. Such reserves could only be purchased and soldatmarketprices.
They may not be destroyed or disposed of on international markets by using export
subsidies.  This would preserve the stabilizing/food  security role of stocks and
prevent  them  from  being  used as  a  disguised  method  to  transfer  income  to
producers. Countries would also be permitted to enter into bilateral or multilateral
arrangements  to  guarantee  market  access  or  to  establish  supply/purchase
commitments at market prices.  Such arrangements would provide a guarantee of
availability/market  access  for  some  quantity  of  a  commodity  but  without  a
restriction  on  prices.  Through  these  measures,  food  security  and  stability
concerns could be met without distorting world prices.
Environmental  Policies
All countries have policies that restrict or promote the use of agricultural
resources - land, water, fertilizers,  and agricultural  chemicals - which may
have environmental consequences.  Industrial countries place a relatively high
public value  on environmental quality and natural resource conservation.  The
public  perception  in  such  countries  is that  factor  markets  may  fail  to  price
resources at their true social value.  Concerns over the resource degradation that
can result from the intensification of  land and water use in agriculture are reflected
in a variety of policies.  In some cases measures can be used to regulate, restrict,
or tax the use of resources in order to maintain environmental quality.  In other
cases, subsidies may be paid to promote a reduction  in resource use or changes in
production practices to meet environmental objectives. Such policies often affect
production and trade.  (See box on next page.)
17Many countries also have policies that provide explicit input subsidies (like
tax credits for forestland clearing; subsidies for fertilizers and pesticides; subsidized
production credit; provision of irrigation water at less than full economic  cost;
publicly financed land improvements for drainage and flood control) to producers.
These may also have environmental and trade consequences.
THE U.S.  CONSERVATION  RESERVE
The 1985 Food Security Act  established a Conservation Reserve Program
(CRP) to place environmentally vulnerable land into cover crops.  Under the
program,  the U.S.  Department  of Agriculture  enters  into  annual  rental
contracts with farmers for a ten-year period.  Unlike earlier land retirement
programs  which  were designed  to  reduce crop  surpluses,  environmental
objectives are the primary  focus of the CRP.  Nevertheless,  the program
contains elements  of  supply  control.  Land  eligible  for  the  program  is
determined by a set of physical characteristics but the amount of vulnerable
land to be taken out of each crop is determined by the extent to which that crop
is in surplus.  This requirement  may be trade distorting  and would not be
consistent with the GATT.  Furthermore,  the requirement does not result in
the greatest environmental benefits.  Analysis  shows that with free trade a
CRP of the type used in  1986-87  would  generate environmental benefits
valued  at  $126  million  per  year through  reduced  soil erosion.  A  more
environmentally-specific  conservation reserve targeted to removal of the 32
million acres of the most erodible land, rather than to supply control, would
increase the amount of land removed and would result in benefits valued at
$227 million per year.  The removal of highly erodible land would reduce
U.S. production of some crops and would raise their prices on world markets.
Although trade is affected, the program would not be trade distorting.  The
CRP merely internalizes the  environmental effects of production and generates
crop prices which reflect their social costs.
18Environmental  Policies Under the GATT
Resource policies whose sole objective is to increase domestic commodity
production  should be considered  'trade distorting'  from  the perspective of the
GATT and be subject to reform.  Such policies would include the explicit input
subsidies cited above.  Resource policies whose objective is the protection of the
nation's natural resource base for current or future  generations  should not be
considered trade distorting although they may have trade effects.  If soil erosion
or  other  environmental  damage  is  taking  place  as  the  result  of commodity
production,  the  payment of incentives  or imposition of regulations  to remove
environmentally  sensitive  land from  crop production  are  legitimate ways  of
dealing with the social costs of such production.  While the land would not have
to be removed from production permanently,  the removal  should be long term.
Environmental programs should not be used to provide short-term income support
to producers, but rather to promote long-run adjustments  in land use.  Similarly,
a tax imposed on the source of environmental damage (on purchases of fertilizers
or pesticides,  for example)  might be another way  to correct  for effects  of the
difference between private and social valuations of the environment.  Taxes on
inputs could be rebated to the producer but only as part of an income support
program of the type discussed under PEG above.
Resource policies that  restrict the use of  inputs other than land for environmental
protection  may  also tend to reduce  commodity supply  and hence  have  'trade
effects'. Clear guidelines need to be established in the GATT that will distinguish
legitimate sets of policies to reduce socially recognized environmental  costs of
private production decisions from those that primaly reduce commodity supply.
Provision of Public Goods
A number of agricultural policies relate to the provision of 'public goods'.
These are goods  or services  whose supply  is judged  to be insufficient without
government  provision.  Public  goods  policies  currently  in  place  include
noncommodity  specific  research  and  development  expenditures,  extension
(education)  activities,  the  provision  of  information,  inspection  and  grading
facilities, infrastructuraldevelopment,resource adjustment assistance (retraining,
etc.) and taxes and restrictions to protect food quality and safety.  Many of these
policies  have a direct or indirect effect on trade and could be trade distorting.
Public Good Policies Under the GATT
A number of trade measures are used by governments  to protect crops and
animals from disease, as well as protecting food safety and human health. In order
19to minimize.the trade-distorting effects of such policies, it is necessary that a set
of principles be agreed to prevent health and safety standards from being used as
a device to protect the incomes of domestic  producers.  In enforcing  standards,
these must be applied equally to domestic and imported products.  For example,
if  an inspection requirement is imposed on imported products to monitor chemical
residues, aparallel requirement must be adopted for domestic products.  Standards
should be applied to the product itself rather than to the production or processing
practices.  Regulations for pesticide use on fruit imports, for example, should be
based on evidence of pesticide residue on the imported product-  not on whether
the pesticide is banned or restricted in the exporting country. Countries will differ
in the extent to which they value such things as food quality and safety. Codes will
be needed to establish the guidelines for such standards in the GATT to ensure the
maximum degree of harmonization,  and to prevent the use of standards to distort
international competition and international trade.
The provision of  public goods such as extension services and R & D increases
the productive capacity of agriculture, involves  direct government expenditure,
and will indirectly affect international  trade.  The basic issues are whether these
services  would  have  been  provided  by  the  private  sector  in  the  absence  of
government involvement and whether there are mechanisms for cost recovery by
governments.  Unlike the establishment of regulations and standards which force
producers  or  processors  to  internalize  the  costs  of  more  wholesome  food,
taxpayers  generally  pay  for the costs  of these programs.  In  this  sense,  they
represent a transfer of production costs  to the taxpayer.  However,  R & D and
extension activities have helped to lower the costs of food for consumers.  They
have provided benefits  which have  not been captured by producers, but by  the
public  at large.  Where the  costs or the  benefits of a particular  undertaking  or
practice are borne by society, it is frequently  more efficient for the public to bear
these expenses directly rather than to try to force the private sector to absorb them.
Government  expenditures of this type  should  be monitored  by  the GATT  for
possible  trade-distorting  effects  and  general  principles  agreed  on  admissible
public good activities.
20Conclusions
*  Governments intervene in agricultural markets  to achieve  domestic political
objectives,  including  farm  income  support,  stability  and  food  security,
environmental goals and the provision of various 'public goods'.
*  The role of the GATIT  negotiations  is to minimize  the international  trade
distortions  resulting  from  the  measures  used  to  achieve  domestic  policy
objectives.
*  In order to achieve  less-distorting  farm  income  support, a  measure  called
'Production Entitlement  Guarantees'  (PEGs) is  proposed.  This  limits  the
quantity of production  eligible for support at the farm  level and replaces all
other forms of direct or indirect income support to farmers.  The advantages of
PEG are that it:
(1) provides  a  means  for  governments  to  reduce  trade  distortions  while
maintaining farm income support;
(2)  allows countries to realize mutual gains from freer trade through increased
world  prices,  reduced  consumer  prices,  and  involves  a  known  and,
therefore,  limited level of budgetary expenditures;
(3)  is consistent with the concept of traditional commodity programs which
provide support based on production;
(4)  is a more cost-efficient mechanism for  transferring income to farmers than
current agricultural programs;
(5) provides substantial national flexibility in the targeting of support in terms
of commodities, farms, farmers, or regions;
(6)  is consistent  with  recent trends  in  limiting support  payments  in many
countries.
*  A PEG-type program could also be used to provide transitory compensation to
farmers  for any  loss of income  resulting  from  trade  liberalization,  and to
facilitate adjustment to freer trade.  Additional measures may be required for
up-stream  and  down-stream  industries  affected  by  trade  liberalization.
Assistanceshouldbedirected  towards theretrainingandrelocationofdisplaced
labor and the provision of compensation for losses in the asset values of firms
in agriculturally-related  industries.
21*  The  reform  of existing  agricultural  policies  would  contribute  to  greater
stability in international markets. Domestic stability and food security objectives
could be further  enhanced through  a number of minimally  trade-distorting
measures:
(1)  the stabilization of  producer incomes could be achieved through individual
or sector-specific insurance or stabilization funds. Maximum government
contributions to these funds would be bound under the GATT as would
their operating  rules.
(2)  consumer stability and food security would be enhanced  by prohibiting
the use of internationally destabilizing policies, e.g. export embargoes; by
improving  the functioning and coordination  of public  storage  policies
(with  stabilization  rather  than income  support  functions);  and through
bilateral or  multilateral  arrangements  to  guarantee  market  access  for
exporters and access to supplies at market prices for importers.
*  Environmental programs which use subsidies, taxes, or regulation to influence
resource use should be permitted  under the GATT if they promote the long-
term resource adjustments consistent with environmental objectives.  Resource
policies  whose aim  is  to  increase  domestic  production,  e.g. subsidies  for
irrigation,  production  credit,  land clearing  or drainage,  and  for agricultural
chemicals are trade distorting and should not be permitted.
*  Government policies  which provide public  goods, such as the protection  of
health  and  safety,  should  be applied  in a  nondiscriminatory  way  on  both
domestic  production  and  imports  in  order  to  minimize  trade  distortions.
Taxpayer supported research and development and extension programs may
have an impact on trade but frequently create benefits for consumers through
lower  food  costs.  Such  activities  should  be  monitored by  the GATr  for
possible trade-distorting effects  and general principles agreed  on their use.
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